Introduction
The United States has recently suffered from two extraordinary calamities caused by the failure to regulate effectively: the 2008 Wall Street collapse, which precipitated the worst recession since the Great Depression, and the explosion of BP's Deepwater Horizon oil rig, which precipitated the largest oil spill in the country's history. These twin disasters, and other regulatory failures in recent years, indicate the very real dangers of under-regulation and lax enforcement. But rather than seek to strengthen the regulatory system that safeguards people and the environment, the U.S. House of Representatives-now under Republican control and steeped in anti-government sentiment, thanks to the influx of Tea Party freshmen-has mounted a full-throated attack on those safeguards during the past few months, convening dozens of hearings focused on the alleged evils of government regulation and offering numerous bills designed to slow down the regulatory process and weaken regulation.
In an attempt to persuade Americans that government regulation is choking off the economic recovery, regulatory opponents have cited time and again a study that claims that regulation has an annual cost of $1.75 trillion. In any earlier CPR White Paper, we demonstrated why this estimate is unreliable and exaggerated.
1 Regulatory opponents resort to this scare tactic because they cannot demonstrate that the country is ill served by government regulation. Still, public opinion polling tells us that many Americans are suspicious of government regulation in the abstract, a reaction on which regulatory opponents seek to capitalize.
2 But, when asked about specific regulatory initiatives, such as limits on greenhouse gas emissions and stricter regulations on oil drilling, a significant majority of Americans are supportive.
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The second reaction is understandable-and of more relevance to policymakers. Government regulation has greatly benefited the American public, while the failure to regulate has cost us dearly. This reality is easily missed because no one statistic or set of numbers can prove this point. But, when the available evidence is compiled, it demonstrates the importance of regulation in protecting people and the environment, and the improved conditions that regulations have produced. This CPR White Paper is the first report to assemble this evidence and consider its significance.
Saving Lives, Preserving the Environment, Growing the Economy: The Truth About Regulation
The evidence we have compiled paints a compelling picture in favor of how government has and can benefit our society:
• The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates that regulatory benefits exceed regulatory costs by 7 to 1 for significant regulations. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that the regulatory benefit of the Clean Air Act exceeds its costs by a ratio of 25 to 1. Similarly, a study of EPA rules issued during the Obama Administration found that their regulatory benefits exceeded costs by a ratio as high as 22 to 1. • In the 40 years since Congress enacted health, safety, and environmental protection laws, regulatory agencies have significantly reduced fatalities, injuries, illnesses, and environmental damage, as several examples of regulatory successes demonstrate.
• The BP Oil Spill and the Wall Street collapse have imposed billions-perhaps even trillions-of dollars in damages, far more than the cost of regulation that would have prevented these tragedies. Similarly, the failure to regulate day-to-day hazards results in thousands of deaths, tens of thousands of injuries, and billions of dollars in economic damages every year.
• Dozens of retrospective evaluations of regulations by the EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have found that the regulations were still necessary and that they did not produce significant job losses or have adverse economic impact on the regulated industries, including on small businesses.
• Agency estimates of the prospective economic benefits and costs of regulations nearly always find that their benefits exceed their costs. This result is especially significant because limitations in the methodology used to produce these estimates systemically underestimate benefits while overestimating costs. On the rare occasion when a regulation fails a cost-benefit test, the methodological problems associated with prospective cost-benefit analysis are usually the reason.
Much of the evidence that we present is not in the form of a cost-benefit analysis-the prevailing approach to evaluating the value of regulations in the federal government. Nearly four decades of experience has demonstrated that this approach is deeply flawed for a variety of reasons, including, as just noted, that regulatory benefits are understated in many analyses and regulatory costs are overstated. 4 These and other limitations counsel that policymakers should take an approach to evaluating regulation that considers all relevant information, as we have done. The United States is better off because of the regulation it has in place, and it would be even better off if current regulatory gaps were closed. This reality, however, has not slowed the assault on regulation, driven largely by corporate interests. Because regulatory opponents cannot deny the actual record, they have pursued another tactic: They claim that high regulatory costs are responsible for slowing down the economic recovery and for slowing job growth. This contention, however, fails in three ways:
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• Genuine public policy arguments must take into account both economic benefits and costs. Rather than engage in genuine public policy arguments, however, regulatory opponents seek simply to reduce or eliminate government regulation in order to benefit regulated industries' bottom lines. Lacking in their argument is a principled effort to compare costs to benefits. After advocating for years that regulations should be measured solely by means of a cost-benefit test, regulatory opponents are now ignoring the benefits, effectively moving the goal posts in this debate.
• Contrary to the claims of regulatory opponents, regulatory costs usually do not translate into job and other economic losses. This result makes sense, since the money spent on regulation spurs economic activity in the form of goods purchased and services rendered. This is why most studies indicate that regulation does not decrease employment and that it can lead to increases in employment in some cases.
• The $1.75 trillion cost estimate used by regulatory opponents to justify their opposition to regulation is based on unreliable data, as the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service has recently pointed out.
This White Paper focuses on the real record of government and regulation, proceeding in three steps. We first present several kinds of evidence of what government regulation has accomplished and what it could accomplish in protecting the American public and the environment. Next, we defend this holistic approach to evaluating government regulation and explain why our approach is preferable to the narrower cost-benefit approach favored by economists. Finally, we summarize the available evidence of the impact of regulation on job creation, which demonstrate that regulation does not lead to a net loss of jobs and may even increase the number of jobs.
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The Impact of Government Regulation
Although the success of government regulation cannot be captured in a single number or metric, we do have several tools available for evaluating the impact of regulation. The impact of regulation can be evaluated by looking at studies that compare the cumulative benefits and costs for groups of regulations; measurements of the extent to which fatalities, injuries, diseases, and environmental destruction has been reduced; the costs associated with the failure to regulate effectively; retrospective evaluations of the impact of individual regulations; and prospective estimates of the benefits and costs of individual regulations.
Only by employing all of these tools can we get a fuller appreciation for the valuable role that regulation plays in our society. This section of the White Paper summarizes what the use of these tools tells us.
Cumulative Studies
Three studies present estimates of the cumulative net benefits of a defined group of government regulations. The OMB prepares annually a report to Congress on federal regulations that aggregates the benefits and costs from regulatory analyses that agencies develop as part of the rulemaking process. 5 The OMB's draft 2011 report found that major federal regulations issued between October 1, 2000, and September 30, 2010, produced benefits ranging from $136 billion to $651 billion as compared to costs ranging from $44 billion and $62 billion.
6
The EPA's recent report, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act from 1990 to 2020, calculates the total annual costs and benefits of regulations issued by the agency pursuant to the Clean Air Act as of 2010, and projects what the total annual costs and benefits will be as of 2020.
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This report concludes that as of 2010 Clean Air Act regulations produced annual benefits of $1.3 trillion at an annual compliance cost of $53 billion. The report further projects that the value of Clean Air Act regulatory controls will be $2 trillion annually by 2020; costs of compliance in that year will be $65 billion.
A recent report by the Economic Policy Institutes (EPI) evaluates the cumulative impact of "new" major EPA rules.
8 Similar to the OMB's annual report, the EPI report derives its results by aggregating the benefits and costs from the regulatory analyses that the EPA has prepared for the rules under investigation. The EPI report found that the major EPA rules issued during the first two years of the Obama Administration produced total annualized benefits of between $44 billion and $148 billion, as compared to total annualized costs of between just $6.7 billion and $12.5 billion. Similarly, the EPI report found that four of the proposed major rules that the EPA was developing at the time that the report was issued generated total annualized benefits of between $173 billion and $457 billion, as compared to total annualized costs of between just $14 billion and $15 billion. In all three studies, benefits exceed costs by large amounts, as While these reports do not tell us whether total regulatory benefits would exceed total costs, they do suggest, if data were available to make the necessary calculations, we would find that regulation overall provides a net benefit to the United States.
Reduction in Fatalities, Injuries, and Environmental Damage
It is easy to lose sight of just how many hazards have been restrained by regulation over the years. But it is important to recall what has changed since the dawn of the modern regulatory era, which started in the mid-1960s. During the 1960s and 1970s, rivers caught fire, cars exploded on rear impact, workers breathing benzene contracted cancer, and a chemical haze settled over the industrial zones of the country's cities and towns. Since then, regulatory agencies like the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the EPA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and OSHA have achieved remarkable success in protecting public health, safety, and the environment. Today, the most visible iterations of these threats are under control, and millions of people have been protected from premature death and debilitating injury. Specific examples of regulatory successes abound:
• EPA regulation of the discharge of pollution into water bodies nearly doubled the number of waters meeting statutory water quality goals from around 30 to 40 percent in 1972 (when the modern Clean Water Act was first enacted) to around 60 to 70 percent in 2007.
13
• EPA regulations protecting wetlands reduced the annual average rate of acres of wetlands destroyed from 550,000 acres per year (during the period from the mid1950s to the mid-1970s) to 58,500 acres per year (during the period from 1986 to 1997), a nearly 90-percent reduction.
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• EPA Clean Air Act rules saved 164,300 adult lives in 2010, and will save 237,000 lives annually by 2020. • EPA air pollution controls saved 13 million days of work loss and 3.2 million days of school loss in 2010. By 2020, they will save 17 million work loss days and 5.4 million school loss days.
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• Working together, the EPA and the state of California have reduced the number of Stage 1 Smog Alert days in Southern California from 121 days in 1977 to zero days since 1997.
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• EPA regulations phasing out lead in gasoline helped reduce the average blood lead level in U.S. children aged 1 to 5 from 14.9 micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood (µg/dL) during the years 1976 to 1980 to 2.7 µg/dL during the years 1991 to 1994. Because of its harmful effect on children's brain development and health, the Center for Disease Control considers blood lead levels of 10 µg/dL or greater to be dangerous to children. During the years 1976 to 1980, 88 percent of all U.S. children had blood lead levels in excess of this dangerous amount; during the years 1991 to 1994, only 4.4 percent of all U.S. children had blood lead levels in excess of 10 µg/dL.
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• Thanks to its effective implementation of the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, the FDA blocked thalidomide from being marketed in the United States, where it likely would have caused thousands of birth defects.
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• Improved regulation of slaughterhouses and meat-processing plants by the Department of Agriculture significantly decreased the incidence of food-borne illnesses caused by tainted beef between 1996 and 2001, including a 49-percent decrease traced to Yersinia, a 35-percent decrease traced to Listeria, a 27-percent decrease traced to Campylobacter, and a 15-percent decrease traced to Salmonella.
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• NHTSA's vehicle safety standards have reduced the traffic fatality rate from nearly 3.5 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled in 1980 to 1.41 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled in 2006.
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• Effective regulation of fireworks by the CPSC more than halved the average number of injures per 100,000 pounds of fireworks sold from 42.8 during the period of 1976 to 1978 to 21.2 during the period of 1991 to 1993.
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• OSHA workplace regulations helped reduce worker fatality rates from 18 deaths per 100,000 workers in 1970 to four deaths per 100,000 workers in 2006.
23
• MSHA mining safety regulation reduced miner fatality rates from 0. The Japanese Earthquake and Nuclear Power Plan Crisis
The Japanese earthquake and the resulting nuclear power plant crisis highlight both the benefits of good regulation and the catastrophic costs of failing to regulate effectively. Japan has some of the strictest building codes in the world, requiring buildings to employ cuttingedge technologies, such as giant rubber pads and hydraulic shock absorbers, to better enable them to withstand powerful earthquakes. Other regulations seek to protect Japanese citizens against tsunamis, including those requiring the construction of large seawalls along the coast and the establishment of well-marked escape routes for regions that are susceptible to flooding. Japanese citizens are also well prepared for how to respond to natural disasters, thanks to regulations requiring periodic earthquake and tsunami drills. These and other regulations undoubtedly saved countless lives. 35 At the same time, the country's lax regulatory oversight of the nuclear power industry, and particularly the degree to which industry dominated its government overseers, appears to be responsible for creating the second worst nuclear crisis in history, following only the Chernobyl power plant disaster in 1986. 36 Just weeks before the earthquake, government regulators approved a 10-year extension for the oldest of the six reactors at the Fukushima nuclear power plant facility, despite being aware of several problems with crucial components of the reactor's cooling system. Regulators were also aware that the company that owned and operated the facility, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), had not adequately inspected several of these components as well. After the earthquake and tsunami, the reactor's cooling system ultimately failed, allowing the reactor pool to overheat and emit radioactive materials.
The accident prompted the Japanese government to evacuate everyone located within 20 kilometers (12 miles) of the stricken plant, displacing more than 78,000 people and leaving behind eerie, empty ghost towns. 37 The radioactive fallout from the plant has tainted parts of the food and drinking water supply, further compounding the country's misery. 38 The monetary costs of this catastrophe will be enormous. TEPCO has already pledged to compensate each of the evacuated households about $12,000 each, and some estimate that the costs of cleaning up the contamination could exceed $10 billion-most of which will be borne by the Japanese taxpayer, instead of by TEPCO-and take up to several decades to complete. 
Retrospective Evaluations
Several statutory provisions mandate regulatory look-backs, including section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 40 When agencies have performed these look-backs, they have almost invariably found that the regulations have been effective. OSHA's section 610 reviews of its Grain Handling Standard and its Cotton Dust Standard, summarized in Table 4 , are typical of the positive results that agencies have found. Table 4 : OSHA Section 610 Reviews Appendix A, which provides an overview of 38 section 610 reviews conducted by OSHA and the EPA, establishes the following:
• Each review concludes that there is a "continued need" for the regulation, meaning that a significant risk to public health, safety, or the environment exists, and that the controls called for in the regulation continue to be successful in reducing that risk.
• In every case but one, the reviews concluded that the rule did not require any major modification to increase its effectiveness or reduce its costs.
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• The regulations have not been unduly costly on industry, and none had a significant adverse impact on the industry. In a few cases, the actual cost of complying with the regulation was significantly lower than what was projected at the time the rule was under development.
47
• Existing regulations were often supported by regulated entities, 48 and when this was not the situation, regulated entities supported reform of the regulation, not its elimination. 49 In several cases, the agency received no comments from regulated entities when it reviewed a regulation. 
Prospective Regulatory Analyses
The prospective cost-benefit analyses that agencies produce during the rulemaking process find that the estimated benefits of a rule usually are greater than the estimated costs. During a recent Senate hearing on regulation, Cass Sunstein, the current Administrator of the Office of Information of Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), said that the Obama Administration had only issued one rule as of April of 2011 that failed to produce net benefits.
51 Table 5 In reality, the percentage of significant regulations that produced positive net benefits is likely much larger, since the agencies that issued these regulations were unable to estimate values for many of the rules' most important benefits. For example, the Department of Agriculture's 2001 Roadless Conservation rule was found to produce negative net benefits, even though the only benefits that were estimated for the rule were the resulting cost savings from reduced road maintenance activities. The more important benefits of the rule-such as improved air and water quality, enhanced recreational opportunities, and protected wildlife habitat-were left out of the equation completely. 54 Similarly, NHTSA's 2002 Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS) rule was found to produce negative net benefits, even though the only benefits that were estimated were those associated with fuel savings and reduced tire wear. The fact that the rule might save as many as 124 lives and prevent as many as 8,722 injuries every year was not included in the final cost-benefit equation.
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More broadly, as explained in greater detail below, prospective cost-benefit analyses usually underestimate benefits and overestimate costs. The high percentage of prospective regulatory analyses that find positive net benefits is therefore particularly striking. 
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How to Evaluate Regulation
This White Paper utilizes multiple perspectives to evaluate government regulation. The available data clearly establish that government regulation has greatly benefited the American public, and that the failure to regulate has cost us dearly. This evidence of the benefits of government regulation, however, does not fit into the cost-benefit perspective that economists prefer, but it nevertheless provides a more reliable and more meaningful method for evaluating regulation.
According to economic theory, a given regulation is socially valuable as long as its economic benefits exceed its economic costs. This method of evaluating regulation is known as a cost-benefit analysis. Because this approach is deeply flawed, a number of CPR scholars have endorsed an alternative approach, which is based on a pragmatic methodology.
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Pragmatism refers to a methodology of evaluating public policy that has been developed and championed by a significant number of social scientists for more than half a century. In contrast to cost-benefit analysis, a pragmatic regulatory analysis takes into account all data relevant to the assessing the value of government regulation, regardless of whether it can be used in a cost-benefit formula.
Section I of this White Paper uses a pragmatic approach for evaluating the U.S. regulatory system as a whole. It compiles a mosaic of information that is relevant to assessing the value of regulation. This includes various measures of how the United States has benefited from regulation, whether or not they are expressed in dollar terms, and information about the costs of such regulation. Pragmatism understands that once the relevant information is assembled, decision-makers must assess it holistically and judge what it tells them about the value of regulation. In the real world, decision-makers have no simple formula that indicates what to do once the numbers are fed into it.
In contrast, cost-benefit analysis provides a less effective approach for evaluating the U.S. regulatory system as a whole. A significant problem with cost-benefit analysis is that it tends to underestimate regulatory benefits, and often substantially so. The benefits that environmental, health, and safety regulations produce-lives saved, asthma attacks averted, ecosystems protected-involve values that cannot adequately be reduced to monetary terms. This situation exists for several reasons. One is that scientific estimates of risk are not precise enough to permit analysts to make reasonable estimates of the monetary benefits. While the science is sufficient to instruct us that a significant risk exists, the benefits of addressing that risk cannot be accurately measured.
When regulatory benefits cannot be measured, the agencies simply drop them from the cost-benefit equation, arbitrarily assigning them a value of zero dollars. This occurred with the benefits estimate for NHTSA's 2006 rule setting new fuel efficiency standards for light trucks. The benefits estimate for this rule did not include global warming impacts, because NHTSA deemed them too difficult to quantify. 57 This meant the cost-benefit analysis Saving Lives, Preserving the Environment, Growing the Economy: The Truth About Regulation assigned no dollar value whatsoever to one of the most important reasons for promulgating a rule in the first place. Its value simply disappeared from the tally.
To make matters worse, cost-benefit analyses typically shrink benefits estimates even more by "discounting" those benefits that occur in the future. The OMB requires agencies to apply a 3-or 7-percent discount rate to these future benefits to reflect how much we would have to invest today to have that much money when the benefit is delivered. But as a matter of arithmetic, if these discount rates are applied for a long enough time horizon, then any regulatory benefit, no matter how large, can be shrunk to virtually nothing. Thus, regulations to address climate change or prevent cancers with a latency period of 20 or 30 years would be considered to have very little, if any, value.
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While regulatory benefits are underestimated, costs tend to be overestimated. To generate cost estimates for their cost-benefit analyses, agencies primarily rely on surveys of representative companies that the regulation will likely affect. Because companies know the purpose of the surveys, they have a strong incentive to overstate costs in order to skew the final cost-benefit analysis toward weaker regulatory standards. 59 Agencies must also fill in any data gaps they encounter by making various assumptions. Due to fear of litigation over the regulation, they tend to adopt conservative assumptions about regulatory costs, and the cost assessment ends up reflecting the maximum possible cost, rather than the mean. 60 As Table 6 indicates, several retrospective studies of regulatory costs have found that the pre-regulatory cost estimates are often too high. The Attack on Government Regulation
Study
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Virtually every tool we have available for evaluating federal regulations indicates that regulation has substantially benefited the American public and that the lack of regulation is responsible for causing extraordinary damage to people, the environment, and the economy. Rather than deny these facts, regulatory opponents contend that the cost of regulation is slowing the economic recovery. They support this claim by pointing to what they consider to be the high costs of regulation. But three major flaws are apparent in this argument.
First, cost estimates used by regulatory opponents to justify their opposition to regulation are based on unreliable data. Second, as discussed earlier, even if regulatory costs are high, economic theory supports regulation if the benefits are larger than the costs. Regulatory opponents ignore the benefits of government regulation, but as Section II demonstrates, available comparisons indicate benefits nearly always exceed costs. Finally, regulatory costs do not translate into job losses because money spent on regulation stimulates economic activity. This is why most studies indicate that regulation does not decrease total employment and that it can even lead to increased employment in some instances.
Incredible Costs
Regulatory opponents cite a 2010 study by Nicole Crain and Mark Crain, done for the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA), which stated, among other claims, that the annual cost of federal regulations in 2008 was about $1.75 trillion. 65 In fact, this estimate is the centerpiece of their antiregulatory campaign. 66 This tactic dates back to Ronald Reagan's campaign for president, when he also pointed to an estimate of the cost of regulation as evidence that government was inhibiting economic growth.
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A recent CPR White Paper found that the methods used by Crain and Crain to arrive at their cost figure were sufficiently flawed that their estimate must be regarded as unreliable. 68 Subsequently, the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service (CRS) published its own report examining the study, which found the same flaws as identified in the CPR report, and additional problems as well. 69 OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein has characterized Crain and Crain as "deeply flawed" and referred to the study as an "urban legend."
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The more serious problem is with the methodology Crain and Crain used to construct a hypothetical cost of economic regulation, which constitutes 70 percent of their total $1.75 trillion cost figure. The basis for their estimate is polling data published in a World Bank study concerning the regulatory climate of different countries. In an email to the CRS, one Saving Lives, Preserving the Environment, Growing the Economy: The Truth About Regulation of the authors of the World Bank study confirmed that Crain and Crain had misinterpreted the World Bank data. He went on to indicate that the data would not support the use to which Crain and Crain had put it, and that the data are too unreliable to be the basis for the type of estimate that Crain and Crain have produced. In addition, the regression formula that Crain and Crain used to make their estimate is too simplistic, ignoring several critical factors that would likely affect their result.
Missing Benefits
According to economic theory, the existence of a regulatory cost estimate, however high, is meaningless without knowing the amount of regulatory benefits that the regulation produces. Furthermore, a net social gain results whenever total regulatory benefits exceed total costs. In an email to the CRS, Nicole Crain and Mark Crain said that their study was "not meant to be a decision-making tool for lawmakers or federal regulatory agencies to use in choosing the 'right' level of regulation," because they made no attempt to estimate regulatory benefits. 71 Nevertheless, this is precisely the use to which regulatory opponents have put it, repeatedly citing it as if it were, in and of itself, an adequate measure of regulation in general.
Employment Impacts
Regulatory opponents contend that environmental, health, safety, and other regulations slow economic growth and contribute to job losses. But, as with any type of spending, regulatory compliance generates economic activity. While it is difficult to measure whether on balance job gains from this spending offset any job losses, existing studies do not support the conclusion that regulation retards economic recovery. Instead, the studies find either no overall impact or, in some cases, an actual increase in employment. 72 This should not be surprising. After all, money spent on regulation contributes to the economy, because firms must buy equipment and labor services in order to comply with regulation. In some cases, regulations can also increase employment by making the affected industry more profitable and more productive. For example, compliance with OSHA's Cotton Dust Standard led the textile industry to modernize their facilities. The investments in new equipment increased the industry's productivity and profitability, enabling it to invest in additional job creation. 77 Entire economy 7 of 9 available studies found increase 1 study found decrease 1 study found mixed results
Table 7: Impact of Environmental Regulation on Employment
In addition to the above studies, the Environmental Policy Institute (EPI) found that Department of Labor data suggest that few jobs are lost because of regulation. 78 The Bureau of Labor Statistics has developed an "extended mass layoff " data series, which examines the reasons why companies lay off 50 or more workers for more than 30 days. Since 2007, about 1.5 million workers per year have lost their jobs in such layoffs. Significantly, the data series is based on employer-supplied information. According to this information, an average of only 0.3 percent of workers lost their jobs because of government regulations or intervention during the years 2007-2009. This result is similar to data concerning layoffs prior to 2007. 79 As the EPI notes, it is "striking" how few of these layoffs employers attribute to government regulations or intervention. 80 (By comparison, the same data find that extreme weather events have caused more extended mass layoffs.
81 ) Moreover, the small number of workers who lost their jobs because of government regulation "pales in comparison to any accounting of the jobs lost in this period due to the regulatory failures that contributed to the economy's financial crisis." Stephen Meyer of MIT compared the economic performance of states with strong environmental regulation to states with weaker regulations. After examining five primary indicators of economic growth and prosperity, he found that there was no evidence that the states with stronger environmental standards fared less well than those with weaker environmental standards. 83 After the 1990-1991 recession, he updated his study to consider whether regulation slowed economic recovery. The results were the same. Meyer found that "stronger environmental standards have not limited the relative pace of economic growth and development among the states over the past twenty years." 84 Another alleged impact of regulation is that it drives companies to transfer manufacturing overseas in order to remain competitive in international markets, which causes job losses at home. Economists have attempted to confirm that businesses flee to "pollution havens" to avoid domestic environmental regulation, but it is difficult to isolate this reason for moving manufacturing overseas from other factors, such as the availability of natural resources, new markets, and the supply and cost of local employees. The studies summarized in Table 8 The evidence about outsourcing due to regulation is mixed at best, and it does not suggest that regulation causes a large shift of manufacturing jobs abroad. 90 Moreover, the fact that environmental regulation may impact the competitiveness of domestic firms does not mean that regulation is the United States is unreasonable. Indeed, firms in the United States spend about the same amount of money on environmental regulation as do the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
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While the cost of regulation may be less in China, few Americans would want to live in a country with the appalling air and water pollution present in China. Finally, regulation can increase competitiveness, rather than decrease it. There is considerable evidence that as firms innovate in response to regulatory requirements, they become stronger international competitors because of the innovation. 
Conclusion
The evidence assembled in this White Paper demonstrates that regulation has greatly benefited the American public, while the failure to regulate has cost us dearly. Nevertheless, regulatory opponents, often citing a misleading estimate of the costs of regulation, support legislation that would reduce and weaken government regulation. Rather than disagree with the evidentiary record presented in this White Paper, regulatory opponents claim that regulation causes job losses and that it is therefore slowing the economic recovery. In fact, as discussed, the available evidence simply does not support this claim. Instead, regulatory costs usually do not translate into job and other economic losses. This result makes sense, since the money spent on regulation spurs economic activity. The available evidence finds that regulation typically has a net neutral impact on jobs or that it can even lead to net increases in the number of jobs in some cases.
This report assembles all of the relevant information about the value of government regulation about which we are aware, and it is the first to collect and holistically analyze this mosaic of information. The picture that emerges from this holistic assessment is that regulation has brought great benefit to the United States without any significant economic dislocation. We know this because:
• Estimates of regulatory benefits-even though they are significantly understatedexceed estimates of regulatory costs-even though they are usually overstatedand often by a substantial amount. This is true whether one looks at aggregated estimates of the benefits and costs of several regulations or at estimates of the projected benefits and costs of individual regulations.
• Regulation has substantially reduced the number of fatalities, diseases, and injuries attributable to health and safety risks as compared to when regulation for these risks did not exist. Similarly, the environment is substantially cleaner and healthier than it was prior to the formation of the EPA and other environmental agencies.
• The failure to regulate produces harms that are undoubtedly greater than the cost of having regulation in place that would help us avoid these harms.
• Regulatory opponents cannot point to any persuasive evidence that government regulation has an unreasonable price tag. One widely cited study claiming that regulation has an annual cost of $1.75 trillion dollars is based on such an unreliable methodology that its estimate should be disregarded. Retrospective studies of regulation have not found any substantial number of firms that have gone out of business, and this holds true for small businesses as well. More generally, the available evidence suggests that regulation has a net neutral impact on jobs, producing news jobs that offset any job losses. In some cases, regulation has actually increased employment. • The pursuit of lower regulatory costs rarely motivates manufacturing firms to move their operations outside of the United States. Rather, this factor is a relatively minor consideration as compared to relative labor costs. In any event, retaining such jobs would require the United States to drop most existing environmental and worker health and safety regulations, returning the country to the overwhelming pollution problems and hazardous workplaces that could be found in the United States prior to the formation of the EPA and OSHA.
What is striking about these various strands of information is that they all point to the same conclusions: Americans have benefited greatly from government regulation; the failure to regulate has had tragic consequences for our economy and our environment; and, when evaluated retrospectively, regulation has not caused significant economic dislocations for regulated industries, or even small businesses.
No one number or set of statistics can convey the value of government regulation. In particular, it is not possible to measure with accuracy and precision the value of regulation using cost-benefit analysis because of serious methodological limitations in that approach. Instead, policymakers should employ the pragmatic approach that we have used, which takes into account all relevant information and evaluates it holistically.
The Republicans who control the House of Representatives, emboldened by their Tea Party supporters, prefer to reward their corporate sponsors by seeking to reduce the role of government in protecting people and the environment. As this White Paper establishes, such a bargain would be foolhardy. No, but the agency will make a minor amendment to partially exempt cotton that has been washed in a new process developed after the original rule was issued. The agency considered and rejected other suggestions for adding flexibilities to the rule.
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No. In fact, the standard helped spur modernization in textile factories that has made the industry more profitable and productive.
The agency received several public comments on the standard, all of which supported the rule. Some of the commenters suggested small technical changes that could be made to the rule. Yes, the rule is needed to reduce both lead exposures in construction employees and disease resulting from these lead exposures. The standard has reduced blood lead levels of exposed employees. Retention of the standard is necessary to continue to achieve that goal because certain construction jobs still have high airborne lead exposures, and compliance data indicate that there are still instances of noncompliance with the standard.
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No, the rule should be continued without change. The agency rejected a recommendation to make the rule less stringent, since it found that the rule in its current form was still needed to protect workers.
No. The rule has not had a negative economic impact on business, including small businesses, in most sectors affected. The construction sector overall is growing in terms of profits, revenues and employment. Small businesses are retaining their share of the business.
The agency received several public comments on the standard, all of which supported the rule. Some of the commenters suggested that the rule be strengthened. Others requested additional compliance assistance. A few recommended that the rule be amended to make it less stringent. 46 The one exception is OSHA's Presence Sensing Device Initiation (PSDI) Standard, which allows industry to install presence sensing device (PSD) systems on their mechanical presses as a means for protecting workers from being injured by the press, provided that an OSHA-approved third party validates the system at installation and once per year thereafter. occupatioNal Safety & health admiN., office of proGram evaluatioN, reGulatory revieW of oSha'S preSeNce SeNSiNG device iNitiatioN (pSdi) StaNdard (2004), available at http://www.osha.gov/dea/lookback/psdi_final2004.html. In its review, OSHA found that no third party sought approval to serve as a validator, and therefore no industrial facilities had installed a PSD system. Nevertheless, the agency still concluded that there was a continued need for the rule (i.e., because mechanical presses still posed a serious injury risk to workers, which PSD systems could significantly reduce), but that the PSDI standard need to be changed, so that it would actually be implemented and provide the intended worker safety benefits. Accordingly, OSHA proposed to revise the PSDI Standard to make it identical, or similar to, an existing industry consensus standard governing mechanical press safety. Id. 39-40 (1998) . 49 For example, members of the textile industry suggested in their comments during OSHA's section 610 review of the Cotton Dust Standard that a provision that exempted certain kinds of "washed cotton" from some of the regulations' requirements be expanded to include cotton that was washed by a new process called "batch kier washing." This washed cotton provision was added to the rule in 1985-seven years after the original Cotton Dust Standard was issued. Following the section 610 review of the Cotton Dust Standard, OSHA agreed with the commenters and announced that it would expand the washed cotton provision to include the new washing process. Such small changes to rules following a section 610 review are not common, but they do show that agencies take the section 610 review process and the public comments they receive seriously. oSha, cottoN duSt revieW, supra note 43, at 58-59. 50 For example, the EPA received no comments for the 610 reviews it conducted on the Control 
